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INTRODUCTION
John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky’s civil recourse theory purports to be
descriptive and unitary. It cannot be both. According to this theory, as a positive
matter, tort law is unified by wrongs and is not designed to be used as an
instrument for purposes such as compensation and deterrence. In this Article, I
argue that civil recourse theory does not offer a complete description of twentyfirst-century tort law. Tort law is not just about civil recourse; at least part of tort
law’s purpose is instrumental. The extent of routinization in tort law, particularly in
automobile accident claims, demonstrates a gap between civil recourse theory and
the tort law it is supposed to describe. In the trenches, insurers and plaintiffs’
lawyers are concerned about the profitability of their portfolio of cases as a whole.
Insurers and many plaintiffs’ lawyers, therefore, routinize the claims system,
increasing its administrability and the compensation of claimants, but reducing or
eliminating the importance of wrongs in a large portion of cases. Civil recourse
theory fails as a descriptive unitary theory of tort law because it does not accurately

† Copyright © 2013 Christopher J. Robinette.
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William & Mary; J.D. 1996, University of Virginia School of Law. I thank my fellow
speakers on the 2012 AALS Annual Meeting Torts & Compensation Systems panel: Guido
Calabresi, Martha Chamallas, John Goldberg, Mike Rustad, and Ben Zipursky. For
reviewing previous drafts and assistance with specific issues, I thank Ken Abraham, Tom
Baker, Ben Barros, Jonathan Cardi, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Kyle Graham, Anna
Hemingway, Jeffrey O’Connell, Sheila Scheuerman, Jane Stapleton, and Jenny Wriggins. I
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Ben’s openness to discussion. May I handle criticism with their grace and sense of humor.

544

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:543

describe automobile accident claims, constituting a majority of tort claims and
three-quarters of tort payments.1
Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge that instrumentalism shapes the nature of
tort law’s wrongs.2 Moreover, they concede that the practice of routinizing claims
is a “potential red flag[]”3 and that “tort law is in some ways out of synch with this
trend.”4 Goldberg and Zipursky’s admissions are necessary for a descriptive theory
of torts, but they reveal civil recourse’s implicit pluralism. If civil recourse is to
remain unitary, it must be articulated as a normative, rather than descriptive, theory.
I. CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY
A. Core Claims
As currently espoused by Goldberg and Zipursky, civil recourse is descriptive.5
It attempts to describe tort law as it is, not as it should be. Distilled to its essence,
civil recourse theory asserts that tort law’s purpose is “providing victims with an
avenue of civil recourse against those who have wrongfully injured them.”6 In his
presentation at the 2012 Association of American Law Schools (AALS) annual
meeting, Goldberg stated that civil recourse theory was composed of three core
“levels” or “components:” (1) rights of action, (2) wrongs, and (3) remedies.7 The
first component, rights of action, arms people with a legal power; this is victim

1. JAMES M. ANDERSON, P AUL HEATON & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, THE U.S.
EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 1 (2010), available at http://www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG860.pdf; see also ROBERT
C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, CHANTAL G.
BROMAGE, SARAH A. GIBSON & ASHLEY N. M ASON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS
28 (2010), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/
Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx.
2. Goldberg & Zipursky Respond to the Quandaries Facing Civil Recourse Theory,
TORTSPROF BLOG (Jan. 12, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2012/01/goldbergzipursky-respond-to-the-quandaries-facing-civil-recourse-theory.html.
3. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S.
LAW: TORTS 396 (2010).
4. Id. at 394.
5. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great
Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 403 (2005) (“Our point here is not that [the principle of civil
recourse] is demanded by principles of justice, or even morally sound, but that it is the
animating idea behind our system of tort law.”).
6. John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1221,
1252 (2008).
7. John C.P. Goldberg, Address at the Association of American Law Schools Annual
Meeting, Twenty-First Century Tort Theories: A New Audit of Civil Recourse Theory (Jan. 5,
2012) [hereinafter Goldberg Podcast], available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2012/
07/podcast-of-2012-aals-panel-on-civil-recourse-theory.html. Cf. Christopher J. Robinette, Why
Civil Recourse Theory Is Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. REV. 431, 433–40 (2011); Jane Stapleton,
Evaluating Goldberg & Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1529–32
(2006).

2013]

TWO ROADS DIVERGE FOR CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY

545

empowerment.8 People are empowered through tort law when they experience a
wrong, the second component of civil recourse theory. Goldberg and Zipursky also
refer to civil recourse theory as “torts as wrongs,”9 and wrongs are clearly the crux
of civil recourse. As Goldberg and Zipursky assert: “[W]e believe that tort liability
is predicated on the commission of a wrong—a failure to act in accordance with a
relational norm of right conduct—that in turn generates in a victim of the wrong a
power to respond to the wrongdoer.”10 Finally, if the victim proves the wrong, he or
she is entitled to the third level of civil recourse theory, a remedy. According to
civil recourse theory, remedies are not about a duty to repair, but a right of
redress.11 As Goldberg notes, “[t]he animating ideas here are relational and
retaliatory, involving notions of empowerment, response, and satisfaction.”12
B. Instrumentalism
The origin of civil recourse theory lies in its rejection of an instrumentalist tort
law. Goldberg and Zipursky specifically contrast their view with the HolmesProsser understanding13 that “[t]ort law is about shifting losses to achieve policy
objectives, not wrongs and recourse.”14 Pursuant to this instrumentalist view, the
most common policy objectives allegedly served by tort law are compensation (or
loss-spreading) and deterrence,15 but sometimes scholars include constraints such
as administrability to the mix.16 Instrumentalism, considered by Goldberg and
Zipursky to be the dominant view in the modern torts academy, has been their
target from the beginning.
According to Goldberg and Zipursky, as a descriptive matter, tort law is not an
instrument to achieve policy objectives; it is about wrongs, and only about wrongs.
As such it is “unitary.”17 A plaintiff has a cause of action “only because the
defendant has committed a legal wrong against the plaintiff”;18 thus, the role of tort
law “is not to deliver deterrence [or] compensation.”19

8. Goldberg Podcast, supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 917 (2010).
10. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1150 (2007).
11. See id.
12. John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 436 (2006).
13. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 1733, 1752–77 (1998).
14. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 924.
15. Id. at 927. But see infra note 19 and accompanying text. Goldberg & Zipursky
identify influential scholars in the instrumentalist tradition as including panel participant
Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner, who received the 2012 Prosser Award during the panel
presentation. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 924, 926–27.
16. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1251.
17. Id. at 1251–52.
18. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV.
1625, 1643 (2002).
19. John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of
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C. Instrumentalism as a Source of the Wrongs
Tort law is certainly unified by wrongs if all that means is that torts consists
only of the causes of action, or “wrongs,” created by courts or legislatures. That,
however, is the “vacuous” understanding of legal wrongs that Goldberg and
Zipursky reject.20 Thus, the source of the content of the wrongs is critical.
Goldberg and Zipursky generally describe the wrongs that comprise tort law as
violations of context-specific social norms that have been elevated, usually by
judges, to the status of law.21 Social norms are “obligations already recognized in
familiar forms of social interaction.”22 With regard to torts, these norms are “social
norms of safe conduct” or “safety norms.”23 Goldberg and Zipursky elaborate and
emphasize the norms depend on context: “In different settings and situations, with
respect to different sorts of interactions, individuals conceive of themselves as
occupying different sorts of normative space governed by different norms of
responsibility that impose different sorts of demands or expectations of them.”24
Tort law “carves up the social world into ‘loci of responsibility’—i.e., particular
contexts governed by norms of appropriate conduct that actors must observe for the
benefit of identifiable classes of potential victims.”25
Of course, not all social norms become law, nor should they. Which social
norms are selected for elevation to legal status? Goldberg and Zipursky are
relatively silent on this process thus far. In a prior article, I briefly suggested that
Goldberg and Zipursky implicitly rely on Benjamin Cardozo’s theory of law and
judging in framing civil recourse theory.26 Cardozo’s view of law, according to
Goldberg, is that “the proper function of the law is to articulate and enforce at least
some of the obligations recognized in and by the community.”27 Judges (and,
occasionally, legislatures) have the task of determining which social norms to
elevate to legal wrongs.28 Furthermore, some legal wrongs have no correlation to
Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1014 (2006).
20. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 948 (defining “vacuous” as “a legal wrong
being anything the law defines as a legal wrong”).
21. Robinette, supra note 7, at 436–37.
22. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 5, at 392.
23. John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 608 (2005).
24. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 5, at 392.
25. Goldberg, supra note 23, at 608 (citing Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 5, at 403–
04).
26. Robinette, supra note 7, at 437 n.34.
27. John C.P. Goldberg, Note, Community and the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing
Cardozo’s Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1335 (1990) (footnote omitted).
28. On this point, Goldberg & Zipursky elaborate:
Nevertheless, because law comes with consequences that morality does not
(most obviously state-enforced sanctions), and because there are, at times,
demands on law that it take a certain form that renders it efficacious, capable of
being internalized, and amenable to application by judges, there will be times at
which it is appropriate for legislatures and judges and jurors to decline to
elevate certain moral norms to legal norms. Similarly, there are sometimes
reasons that favor recognition of legal norms that do not have counterparts in
morality.
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morality, and judges (or, less often, legislatures) must decide when to create legal
wrongs with no moral counterpart.
What role, if any, does instrumentalism play in this process? Recently, Goldberg
and Zipursky acknowledged “instrumental considerations actively shap[e] the
nature of what the courts or legislatures are willing to count as ‘wrongs,’” even
labeling this an “important phenomenon.”29 Moreover, they describe the process of
creating a new legal wrong in the context of strict liability for products in the 1960s
and 1970s: “judges, on the basis of a variety of considerations, decided to cobble
together a new legal wrong out of a mix of existing doctrinal materials and policy
considerations, one that commercial sellers are directed not to commit and that
confers a right on consumers.”30 The policy considerations involved were
compensation and deterrence,31 and Goldberg and Zipursky seemingly
acknowledge that “these goals are being served by products liability law and that
they have played an important motivational role in courts’ decisions to adopt the
doctrine.”32
The assertion that tort law is unitary and its purpose is not to deliver
compensation and deterrence is hard to square with this account. If an important
reason courts created the legal wrong of strict products liability was to compensate
and to deter,33 and strict products liability does, in fact, serve the goals of
compensation and deterrence, it seems to me that at least a purpose of the law is to
compensate and deter. This is true even if products liability is described as a “norm
that products are to be sold in a condition that is safe for ordinary use.”34 The
wrong is being created, at least in part, as an instrument to compensate the injured
and deter similar injuries. There is still a wrong in the sense defined by civil
recourse theory. It is a relational wrong (a wrong by the producer to the consumer),
that is a legal wrong (it was elevated to that status by judges or by the legislature),
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of
View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1586 (2006).
29. Goldberg & Zipursky Respond to the Quandaries Facing Civil Recourse Theory,
supra note 2.
30. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 3, at 303.
31. Id. at 302.
32. Id. at 303.
33. Goldberg and Zipursky are forced to concede this. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). As George Priest noted, “The power of
the Greenman opinion is through its reference to Traynor’s concurring opinion is Escola.”
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 507 n.296 (1985). Traynor’s
Escola concurrence laid out an explicitly instrumentalist rationale for products liability.
Traynor started with deterrence: “[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.” Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944). However, because not all injuries can
be prevented, strict liability would also help spread the losses caused by those injuries: “The
cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.” Id. at 441.
34. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 3, at 286.

548

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:543

and injurious (based on the consumer being hurt). However, the wrong is at least
partially being used to affect the world beyond the parties involved in the injury;
law is being used as an instrument. Goldberg and Zipursky’s descriptive account
fits pluralism better than the unitary vision of civil recourse.
The cautious and conditional language Goldberg and Zipursky select
emphasizes this point. They state:
To say that these goals [compensation and deterrence] are being served
by products liability law and that they have played an important
motivational role in courts’ decisions to adopt the doctrine is not to
say that products liability law (much less tort law in general) is nothing
more than a means for achieving these goals. A body of law has a
content and a life that stands at least somewhat independently of the
reasons that may have justified its adoption.35
There is a significant middle ground between the idea that tort law is unified by
wrongs and the idea that it is “nothing more” than a means for achieving
compensation and deterrence. Similarly, the assertion that tort law stands “at least
somewhat independently” from the reasons justifying its adoption does not mean
those reasons are not a purpose of torts.
II. THE CONCESSIONS
Goldberg and Zipursky have conceded that some parts of tort law do not fully
correspond to civil recourse’s explanatory power.36 Most of the concessions cover
relatively uncommon areas of tort law—wrongful death and survival actions,37
some applications of transferred intent,38 strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities,39 and aspects of punitive damages.40 Two of their concessions, however,

35. Id. at 302–03 (emphasis in original).
36. See Robinette, supra note 7, at 445–47.
37. John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1315, 1341 n.71 (2003) (“Legislatures have occasionally relaxed the wronging requirement,
as by enacting survival and wrongful death actions that permit certain beneficiaries to sue
those who have wronged their decedent.”). This was done for compensatory purposes. See
JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 53–54 (2004).
38. Goldberg, supra note 37, at 1341 n.71. Goldberg concedes, “It is possible,
moreover, that the common law also recognizes limited exceptions to the wronging
requirement. This may be the case, for example, with respect to certain applications of
‘transferred intent.’” Id. He notes that this would “depend on whether the tortfeasor’s
intentional [actions] toward one person [would] also constitute[]” wrongful actions toward
the person actually injured. Id.
39. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 951; see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra
note 28, at 1586 n.72 (stating that abnormally dangerous activities may be “instances in
which tort law functions as a scheme of liability rules (or as Keeton-esque ‘conditional
duties’)”).
40. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 1141 n.58 (“Considerations of deterrence
frequently influence the size of [a punitive damages] award.”). Still, punitive damages are
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are more significant: statutes41 and routinization.42 The remainder of the Article is
devoted to routinization. As a whole, the amount and scope of the concessions
renders civil recourse theory implicitly pluralist.
What is routinization and why is it at odds with a unitary vision of tort law as a
system of individualized justice for the redress of wrongs? Tort law as a system of
individualized justice with a jury as decision maker is necessarily fact specific and,
at least on a case-by-case basis, often unpredictable. According to Goldberg and
Zipursky, routinization is an attempt to create a form of “orderliness and
predictability that is conducive to individuals’ planning their lives.”43
Workers’ compensation is a prime example, but “informal” routinization has
occurred in tort law without legislation.44 Goldberg and Zipursky describe the
process and the benefits to affected parties. The stakeholders in the tort system—
repeat-player defendants, insurers, and practicing lawyers—generally have an
interest in tort law operating more predictably.45 Defendants prefer predictable
liability payments because it allows them to plan ahead. Insurers also prefer
predictable payments because it allows them to set premiums more accurately and
ensure that they earn profits. Plaintiffs’ lawyers working on a contingent fee prefer
a large judgment or settlement in relation to the amount of hours spent on the case.
Within ethical bounds, this often favors the prompt resolution of cases. Thus,
Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge, “lawyers have increasingly sought to manage
the resolution of tort cases privately through pretrial negotiations and settlement.”46
In its simplest form, this involves only the filing of a claim, the defense lawyer’s
failed attempt to have it dismissed, and then settlement at the amount of the
insurer’s coverage.47
Goldberg and Zipursky concede the benefits of routinization: reduced
transaction costs, swifter compensation, and a reduction in uncertainty and
variation.48 Still, routinization “raises potential red flags”49 for Goldberg and
Zipursky. First, Goldberg and Zipursky assert that “[t]ort claimants often are
looking not just for a payment, but also for a sense that their claims are being taken
seriously and that they have to some extent been vindicated.”50 Second, they
believe that the demise of judicial proceedings in favor of insurance-driven
routinization “will somewhat weaken the elaborate system of checks and balances
that has been regarded in Anglo-American political thought as central to sound

“largely” a matter of the “plaintiff’s expanded right of individual redress.” Id. (citing
Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005)).
41. See Robinette, supra note 7, at 456; E-mail from Benjamin C. Zipursky, Assoc.
Dean for Research, Professor of Law, Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, to Christopher J.
Robinette, Assoc. Professor of Law, Widener Univ. Sch. of Law (Dec. 5, 2010, 11:56:25
EST) (on file with author).
42. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 3, at 394–97.
43. Id. at 394.
44. Id. at 394–96.
45. Id. at 395.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 395–96.
48. Id. at 396.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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political design,”51 specifically “the right to have one’s claims heard and
adjudicated.”52 Third, they contend that routinization “threatens to undermine tort
law as a public practice in which standards of right and wrong are set,”53 such that
“the law may increasingly fail to provide guidance to the citizenry as to how they
are obligated to act toward one another.”54 In short, Goldberg and Zipursky
acknowledge that “[a]s a body of law that requires often nuanced, context-specific
judgments about wrongdoing and responsibility, tort law is in some ways out of
synch with [routinization].”55
III. ROUTINIZATION IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS
The problem with simultaneously arguing that tort law is unified by wrongs and
acknowledging that it is out of synch with routinization is that routinization is
prevalent in the American tort system. Routinization is neither a recent
development nor an anomaly in tort law. Before workplace injury claims were
formally routinized by workers’ compensation in the early twentieth century,56 they
were informally routinized. Samuel Issacharoff and John Fabian Witt chronicle the
settlement practices that arose between insurers and workplace injury tort
claimants, sometimes represented by “brokers.”57 They conclude: “[W]hen one
actually looks beyond the [formal system], and instead focuses on the ground-level
practices of claims resolution in the first American experience of mass harm, one
finds a tort system that informally functioned much like the formal workmen’s
compensation system that replaced it.”58 In fact, according to Issacharoff and Witt,
“[m]ature torts [are those] that over time develop repetitive fact patterns and repeatplay constituencies[, and] have persistently resolved themselves into what are
essentially bureaucratized, aggregate settlement structures.”59 In short, they are
routinized.
As Goldberg and Zipursky describe it, routinization is an attempt to make tort
law more predictable and efficient; enhanced administrability is the goal. The
repeat players in the tort system all benefit in some way. The predictability allows
defendants to plan ahead, insurers to set premiums, and plaintiffs’ lawyers to
manage the risk in their portfolio of cases. From the claimants’ perspective,

51. Id. at 396–97.
52. Id. at 397.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 394.
56. See Robinette, supra note 7, at 458–63.
57. Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement:
An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1584–96 (2004).
58. Id. at 1595.
59. Id. at 1573; see also MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 255 (1996) (“It is no secret to those
even modestly familiar with the personal injury system that the ideal of individualized
adjudication, with respect for and attention to the details of the claim, faithful attorneyagents reflecting the interests and desires of the clients, and arbiters listening carefully and
respectfully to the claims and stories of the parties is a myth.”).
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routinization provides compensation that is certain and delivered more swiftly, and,
in automobile accident cases, almost always from a pool of compulsory insurance
funds. Thus, routinization is based in instrumental principles of administrability
and compensation.
Modern examples of routinization in tort law include asbestos and Dalkon
Shield claims. Asbestos is “the paradigmatic case” of routinization.60 High
concentrations of claims are handled by particular claimants’ agents (creating
repeat players), there are very few trials, and there is standardized treatment of
settlement amounts.61 Moreover, asbestos firms began going bankrupt in 1988 and
now the vast majority of claims are administered by trusts, further increasing
routinization.62 Nearly all of the existing asbestos personal injury trusts with assets
of more than $1 billion have retained the Analysis Research Planning Corporation
(ARPC) to manage them.63 To help serve the trusts, ARPC “developed and
implemented state-of-the-art, web-based claims-processing systems.”64 As a result,
the “trusts have processed millions of claims and paid billions of dollars efficiently
and expeditiously, with cost to benefit ratios that are far lower than comparable
settlement approaches.”65
A similar trust-based resolution was reached for Dalkon Shield claims. The
Dalkon Trust (the “Trust”) was established with approximately $2.3 billion to
compensate the thousands of women claiming injuries from the Dalkon Shield birth
control device.66 The Trust offered three settlement options. Under Option 1, the
claimant merely had to state she had used the device and suffered an injury;
claimants received $725 each under Option 1 (and their husbands received $300).67
The Trust paid nearly 85,000 Option 1 claims for a total amount of $60 million.68
Option 2 was for claimants who had good medical proof of use of the device and
associated injuries, but who also had serious alternative causation problems.69
Option 2 provided compensation that was reduced from the pre-petition claims
values because of the causation difficulties;70 payments ranged from $850 to
$5500.71 Option 3 was supposed to provide settlement offers based on pre-petition

60. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 57, at 1618.
61. Id. at 1619.
62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-819, ASBESTOS INJURY
COMPENSATION: THE ROLE AND ADMINISTRATION OF ASBESTOS TRUSTS 16 (2011), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585380.pdf (“Since the establishment of the first trust in
1988 through 2010, available data indicate that asbestos trusts have paid about 3.3 million
claims valued at about $17.5 billion.”). I thank Mike Rustad for this point.
63. ARPC, CASE STUDY: MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS OF MASS TORT TRUSTS,
available at http://www.arpc.com/case-study/management-operations-mass-tort-trusts.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or
Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 617 (1992).
67. Id. at 633.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 631.
70. Id. at 654 n.135
71. Id.
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claims values. These figures were put together by about thirty attorneys who had
been active in Dalkon Shield litigation before the bankruptcy.72
Yet it is automobile accident claims that are emblematic of the importance of
routinization in our civil justice system. In automobile cases, routinization reduces
or even eliminates the significance of wrongdoing, the essence of civil recourse.
Insurance adjusters and plaintiffs’ attorneys resolve many automobile accident
claims with little or no regard to the fault of the parties. This is a significant
problem for civil recourse theory because automobile accidents are responsible for
“an enormous amount of litigation.”73 Automobile accidents constitute a majority
of all tort claims, and “three-quarters of all payouts in the personal-injury liability
system.”74

Automobile accidents as a percentage of tort cases.75
A. Automobile Liability Insurance Becomes Compulsory
Routinization in automobile accident claims can be traced primarily to liability
insurance. Policies covering automobile liability appeared soon after the first

72. Id. at 641.
73. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
74. Id. at 1. For comprising such a large portion of tort law, automobile accidents have
not received a lot of sustained attention in recent years. For exceptions, see Tom Baker,
Liability Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 165
(2007); Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s “Demise,” 61
DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2012); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Automobile Injuries as Injuries with
Remedies: Driving, Insurance, Torts, and Changing the “Choice Architecture” of Auto
Insurance Pricing, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 69 (2010).
75. Thomas H. Cohen, Tort Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics), November 2009, at
fig.1, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tbjtsc05.pdf.
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automobiles were produced at the end of the nineteenth century.76 Coverage,
originally part of a policy on horse-drawn coaches and carriages, evolved rapidly.77
Most significantly, the justification of automobile insurance shifted from protecting
the assets of wealthy drivers to providing compensation for victims.78 Once the
automobile became common, it caused “a hellish carnage.”79 Automobile accidents
from 1915–1932 “multiplied over seven times,”80 and, in 1932, “the automobile
fatality rate ha[d] increased more than 500% since 1913, while the death rate for
other kinds of accidents show[ed] a decline of over 30% for the same period.”81
The increased accidents led to increased reliance on tort law to cover the losses.82
Absent insurance, most individuals and even many businesses could not cover the
losses caused in automobile accidents.83
The proliferation of automobiles, and the damage caused by them, as well as the
need to compensate victims of automobile accidents, caught the attention of
legislators. In January 1927, new insurance requirements for automobile owners
went into effect in Massachusetts and Connecticut; Massachusetts adopted a
compulsory automobile insurance law84 and Connecticut adopted a financial
responsibility law.85 In the short term, financial responsibility laws were more
significant. Under a financial responsibility law, a motorist generally did not have
to purchase automobile insurance until after being involved in an automobile
accident. After an accident, the motorist was required to prove the ability to pay
future damages in order to avoid a penalty, frequently the loss of driving
privileges.86 Typically this proof was made by the purchase of insurance. The

76. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 70–71 (2008).

77. Id. at 71.
78. MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES 801 (9th ed. 2011).
79. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents,
Insurance, and the Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919 to 1941, 4 CONN.
INS. L.J. 521, 540 (1998) (“The rapid growth of motoring coupled with unimproved roads and
a population with no historical experience driving such machines, combined to generate a
hellish carnage that is difficult to appreciate in our era of air bags, engineered highways, and
automobile conscious people.”).
80. REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 17 (1932)
[hereinafter COLUMBIA PLAN].
81. Id.
82. See id. at 20. As a result, the courts became congested. Thirty percent of all new
cases on the calendar of the Supreme Court of New York County between October 1928 and
April 1930 were automobile accidents. Id. A contemporary study of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County found that half of all jury trials were automobile accident
cases. Id.
83. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE
TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 251 (1965).
84. 1925 Mass. Acts 426–31.
85. 1925 Conn. Pub. Acts 3956–58.
86. See, e.g., JEFFREY E. THOMAS, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY
EDITION § 61.01 (Lexis 2011).
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inability to cover damages in the initial accident, however, was a weakness, and
eventually compulsory automobile insurance, under which it is illegal to operate a
vehicle without an insurance policy already in effect, became the dominant
approach to automobile insurance.
Currently forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted
compulsory automobile insurance.87 Compulsory liability insurance and voluntary
liability insurance have different focuses. As the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts stated: “The purpose of the compulsory motor vehicle insurance law
is not, like ordinary insurance, to protect the owner or operator alone from loss, but
rather is to provide compensation to persons injured through the operation of the
automobile insured by the owner.”88
B. Reform Efforts: The Columbia Plan and Keeton-O’Connell
Indeed, the existence of insurance had a major impact on whether an automobile
accident victim recovered. In 1932, the Committee to Study Compensation for
Automobile Accidents, a group of academics, lawyers, and social scientists under
the auspices of Columbia University, published the “Columbia Plan.” In studying
the problem of compensation for automobile accidents, the Committee reviewed
voluminous data. The Committee investigated 2500 closed cases of temporary
disability in which the defendants were insured and 900 cases in which the
defendants were uninsured.89 Claimants received money in 86% of the insured
cases, but only in 27% of the uninsured cases.90 For cases of permanent disability,
the gap was even more significant. In the 192 closed cases with insured defendants,
claimants recovered 96% of the time, whereas in the ninety cases without insured
defendants, claimants recovered only 21% of the time.91 Based on these figures and
similar data from case studies, the Committee stated, “[I]nsurance companies pay
in so large a proportion of the cases in which liability insurance is carried, that the
principle of liability without fault seems almost to be recognized.”92 No American
jurisdiction enacted the Columbia Plan’s reform proposal; the nation’s attention
shifted to World War II, and automobile accident reform faded from the spotlight.93
The next major reform effort for automobile accidents came in 1965, when
Robert E. Keeton and Jeffrey O’Connell published Basic Protection for the Traffic
Victim: A Blueprint for Reforming Automobile Insurance.94 Writing over thirty
years after the Columbia Plan, Keeton and O’Connell reached a similar conclusion
regarding the role of fault in automobile accident claims. In the automobile claims
system, compensation was not conditioned on fault of the tortfeasor and nonfault of

87. Id. The lone holdout, New Hampshire, has a financial responsibility law. Id.
§ 61.02[1].
88. Wheeler v. O’Connell, 9 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Mass. 1937).
89. COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 80, at 203.
90. Id. at 204.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 203.
93. See Joseph A. Page, Roscoe Pound, Melvin Belli, and the Personal-Injury Bar: The
Tale of an Odd Coupling, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 637, 668 (2009).
94. KEETON & O’CONNELL, supra note 83.
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the victim; instead “the theory of full compensation or none yields to the practice of
partial compensation in almost every one of the multitude of settlements.”95 Keeton
and O’Connell also cited statistics, partially derived from studies in the Columbia
Plan, which showed an extremely high recovery rate in automobile accidents when
the defendant was insured. Eighty-seven percent of people suffering serious
personal injury received some money if insurance was involved.96
Keeton and O’Connell offered a basic description of the process by which
insurance affects the fault requirement. The most important way in which insurance
reduces the significance of fault in automobile cases is through settlement
practices.97 Insurers take a collective view of risk; they appraise claims
“impersonally by standards appropriate to the management of a large pool of
risks.”98 An insurer will settle individual claims “whenever this can be done for a
sum representing an appropriate discount from the probable amount of an award if
the case should be tried and lost. This discount is tailored to the degree of
likelihood that the insurer would win if the claim were litigated.”99 The insurer will
“lose” some by settling cases it could have won at trial, but will “win” some by
settling for less than it would have lost at trial. “The insurer’s major concern is the
most economical allocation of available funds to all the claims in the risk pool.”100
Evidence from the Columbia Plan and Keeton and O’Connell demonstrate that
automobile accident law has been routinized for at least eighty years.101
C. The Role of Claims Adjusters
Five years after Keeton and O’Connell’s book was published, H. Laurence Ross
provided the classic account of routinization in automobile accidents from the
perspective of insurance claims adjusters. Entitled Settled Out of Court: The Social
Process of Insurance Claims Adjustments,102 the book provided considerable
empirical data about how claims adjusters actually work.103

95. Id. at 254.
96. Id. at 254 n.14 (citing 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 781 (1956)).
97. Id. at 254.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Moreover, twelve jurisdictions retain a form of Keeton and O’Connell’s “no-fault”
law today, meaning approximately one-fifth of American jurisdictions formally routinized
“nonserious” automobile accident claims by eliminating both the fault requirement for
recovery and noneconomic damages. See, e.g., Paul J. Barringer, David M. Studdert, Allen
B. Kachalia & Michelle M. Mello, Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries: A
Hardy Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 725, 732 (2008).
102. H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS (1970).
103. Ross’s approach was that in order “[t]o understand the legal system and the nature
of rights and duties, it is not sufficient to know the formal rules; one must know the law in
action.” Id. at 6. He recruited three insurance companies willing to cooperate with his
investigation. One was an established company writing all lines of insurance and the other
two were very large mass-market insurers prominent in automobile insurance. From the
three companies, Ross interviewed sixty-seven adjusters and their supervisors in six different
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Ross found further evidence that the fault requirement for automobile accidents
was not strictly applied. Pursuant to formal law, which at that time included
contributory negligence in all but a handful of jurisdictions, studies suggested “that
a literal application of these rules would result in very few recoveries.”104 Yet
actual results were different. Based on the files Ross reviewed, in the “large
majority of cases . . . a claimant who has provable economic loss will recover
something.”105 Moreover, “[f]lat denials are very largely confined to trivial
losses.”106 How did insurance lead to these results? Ross found that the “principal
pressure”107 on adjusters from their supervisors is to “close cases promptly,”108 and
adjusters learn quickly that “claims are extinguished most easily by paying
them.”109
More significantly, Ross found that when the law is applied by claims adjusters,
“[l]iability is understood in mechanical terms rather than those of morality which
are embodied in the formal law.”110 Pursuant to formal law, automobile accident
claims revolve around issues of liability and damages. As to liability, Ross found
that individualized treatment of claims was reduced to a focus on traffic laws:
The formal law of negligence liability, as stated in casebooks from the
opinions of appellate courts, is not easily applied to the accident at
Second and Main. It deals with violation of a duty of care owed by the
insured to the claimant and is based on a very complex and perplexing
model of the “reasonable man,” in this case the reasonable driver. . . . It
is not with this intellectual model, however, that claims men must deal.
In their day-to-day work, the concern with liability is reduced to the
question of whether either or both parties violated the rules of the road
as expressed in common traffic laws. Taking the doctrine of negligence
per se to an extreme doubtless unforeseen by the makers of the formal
law, adjusters tend to define a claim as one of liability or no liability
depending only on whether a rule was violated, regardless of intention,
knowledge, necessity, and other such qualifications that might receive
sympathetic attention even from a traffic court judge. Such a

locations. The interviews were lengthy, often as long as two hours, and covered topics such
as investigation and evaluation of claims, techniques of negotiation with claimants and their
lawyers, and treatment of the problems posed by uncertain liability. In addition, Ross
observed adjusters in the field; on about thirty days, Ross followed an adjuster during all of
the appointments for one day. He took notes and discussed the appointments with the
adjuster when they were finished. Ross supplemented this data with notes from sixty
negotiation sessions between adjusters and plaintiffs’ lawyers and interviews with seventeen
plaintiffs’ lawyers. Finally, he tested his hypotheses with an analysis of 2216 bodily injury
claims closed by one of the insurers in a two-month period in 1962. Id. at 9–12.
104. Id. at 199.
105. Id. at 81.
106. Id. at 247.
107. Id. at 19.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 21.
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determination is far easier than the task proposed in theory by the
formal law of negligence.111
Adjusters put cases into broad categories, such as “rear-enders, red-light cases, stop
sign cases, and the like.”112 According to Ross, “[t]he price paid is reduction of any
meaningful consideration of fault, and the substitution of mechanical presumption
for scientifically based investigation.”113
Simplification is also seen in the damages portion of claims adjustment.
Damages cases are divided into two categories based on level of severity of the
injuries.114 For the smaller or “routine” cases, a formula is used. Formal law would
have a claimant compensated for the pain and suffering she subjectively
experienced. Yet, routine cases “are investigated very superficially, and their
evaluation is relatively mechanical and conventional.”115 Routine cases are valued
by some multiple of medical bills.116 Ross noted, “[t]he formula method is
mechanical and artificial, but it is efficient as a means of disposing of a large
workload of claims.”117 Even in the larger, nonroutine cases in which there is a
deeper and more subtle evaluation, the formula provides a starting point for
negotiation.118
It is an important caveat that Ross found formal law relevant to the claims
process. He did not assert that the two were disconnected: “payment does follow
liability and damages, at least as these are interpreted by the insurance
company.”119 Still the limitations are quite loose, especially for liability: “As
liability becomes more questionable, the claim becomes ‘worth’ less in the
adjuster’s eyes. When there are strong doubts as to the insured’s negligence,
or . . . evidence of contributory negligence[,] . . . the adjuster will define the claim
as one ‘for compromise.’”120 Yet, even under these circumstances “the adjuster is
reluctant to pay less than medical bills.”121 Moreover, some payment is made in the
vast majority of cases with high damages, regardless of the facts on liability.122
From a damages perspective, a potential jury verdict is irrelevant for routine
cases.123 Although a potential jury verdict is relevant for larger cases, even these

111. Id. at 98.
112. Id. at 135.
113. Id. at 100. This is not meant to be critical of the adjusters themselves because “no
insurance system can undertake [an individualized investigation] on a routine basis.” Id.
Instead, “[t]he main critical bearing of this observation is on the premises of those who
believe that some more traditional understanding of fault is meaningful in the automobile
insurance system.” Id.
114. Id. at 106.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 107–08. Often the value is three times the medical bills. See id. at 108.
117. Id. at 110–11.
118. Id. at 111.
119. Id. at 21.
120. Id. at 51.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 202–03.
123. Id. at 112.
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are somewhat routinized.124 Examples include comparison with other “similar”
cases in jury verdict reports and various published formulas made available to
plaintiffs’ attorneys.125 In sum, “even a highly individualistic law, when required to
handle masses of cases, becomes categorical.”126
A final point from Ross’s book about the relationship between formal law and
the claims adjustment process is the relative importance of the defendant-insured
and a repeat-player plaintiffs’ attorney. In theory, the defendant-insured should play
a large role in the process. He is the person allegedly in the wrong. Yet Ross notes
the defendant-insured has a mere “walk-on” role in the claims process.127 This
conclusion is supported by the 1964 “Conard Study” of automobile accidents in
Michigan.128 Conard and his colleagues concluded “the defendant plays a relatively
minor role in the litigation process, even though it is the determination of his guilt
or innocence that is the focal point of the process.”129 When asked if their case had
settled, 92% of the defendants stated that it had; however, 33% did not know the
outcome (whether plaintiff had received a settlement).130 The remaining 8%
incorrectly stated that “the case had not been settled, that no suit had ever been filed
against them, or that they were not familiar with the outcome of the case.”131
On the other hand, a repeat-player plaintiffs’ attorney may lead to a higher
evaluation of a claim, particularly one that is marginal.132 This is because, “[a]n
attorney frustrated in his commitment to his client, or one who is forced to handle a
claim at a net loss, may be a bitter and more formidable opponent in future
negotiations.”133 After all, the insurer’s primary incentive is to achieve profitability
over its portfolio as a whole. Civil recourse theory does not account for the role
adjusters play in tort law.
D. The Role of Plaintiffs’ Lawyers and Settlement Mills
The larger role of plaintiffs’ attorneys in routinizing automobile accident claims,
accompanying that of claims adjusters, was refined by Issacharoff and Witt.134
Except for some isolated exceptions in urban areas,135 early twentieth century
plaintiffs’ lawyers did not generally approach automobile accidents in a

124. Id. at 115.
125. Id. at 115–16.
126. Id. at 23.
127. Id. at 66.
128. ALFRED F. CONARD, JAMES N. MORGAN, ROBERT W. PRATT, JR., CHARLES E. VOLTZ
& ROBERT L. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE
ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964).
129. Id. at 296.
130. Id. at 296–97.
131. Id. at 297.
132. ROSS, supra note 102, at 120.
133. Id.
134. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 57; see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND
COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 211–278 (2007); John Fabian Witt,
Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance
of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 263–71 (2007).
135. See WITT, supra note 134, at 267.
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coordinated, systematic way. That began to change in 1946, when a group of
workers’ compensation claimants’ lawyers formed the National Association of
Claimants’ Compensation Attorneys (NACCA)136 to increase the clout of claimants
and their lawyers in the administration of workers’ compensation. Soon thereafter,
the group’s focus expanded to include tort cases, particularly automobile accidents.
Famed trial lawyer Melvin Belli joined the group in 1949 at its convention in
Cleveland.137 Belli was named NACCA’s president in 1951; the following year he
began giving “Belli Seminars” at the group’s annual convention.138 In these
seminars, the lawyers shared information on trial and settlement practices,
including specific information on expert witnesses, product defects, and other
details about the cases they had across America.139 In 1971, to acknowledge the
expansion of the group’s goals, it was renamed the American Trial Lawyers
Association (ATLA).140
The coordination of plaintiffs’ lawyers had important effects. The sharing of
information about settlement techniques and verdict values helped the plaintiffs’
lawyers overcome the information advantage insurers had long enjoyed. Referral
networks created specialization on the plaintiffs’ side that already existed for
defendants. Personal injury cases were being consolidated; generalists handled
them less often.141 From a routinization standpoint, this was significant. Many more
automobile accident cases now had repeat players on both sides. Although repeatplayer plaintiffs’ lawyers could be threatening to repeat-player defendants, there
were also advantages: “the presence of bargaining agents who knew the short-cuts,
the heuristics, and the rules-of-thumb often made the settlement process
considerably more efficient.”142 The repeat-player dynamics led to adjusters and
plaintiffs’ lawyers swapping cases,143 whereby if one case was settled at 50%
another would be as well, or engaging in “package deals” in which a great many
cases were settled at one time.144
Because of this efficiency, by the mid-1960s automobile accident claims were
being settled at a much faster rate than other tort claims.145 Issacharoff and Witt
offered empirical data that automobile accident claims were settled so rapidly that

136. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 57, at 1610.
137. WITT, supra note 134, at 242.
138. Id. at 242–43. Interestingly, Fleming James, who routinely argued that insurance
undermined fault in tort law, addressed the Eighth Annual Convention of NACCA (1954) in
Boston. His theme for the address was the increase in compensation to accident victims and
the concomitant number of exceptions and distortions to the fault principle. See Fleming
James, Jr., Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 14 NACCA L.J. 226 (1954); Fleming James, Jr.,
Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, Part II, 15 NACCA L.J. 281 (1955).
139. WITT, supra note 134, at 243.
140. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 57, at 1610. The group eventually changed its name
to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. WITT, supra note 134, at 242. It is now the
American Association for Justice (AAJ). AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, http://www.justice.org.
141. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 57, at 1611–12.
142. Id. at 1614.
143. Id. at 1611–12.
144. Id. at 1614 (citing Comment, Settlement of Personal Injury Cases in the Chicago
Area, 47 NW. U. L. REV. 895, 904–05 & n.48 (1953)).
145. Id.
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they were more analogous to formally routinized workers’ compensation claims
than they were to other tort claims: “The striking feature is the similarity of the
mature tort injury system in auto claims to the administrative system of workmen’s
compensation.”146 Both the formal and informal systems compensated much larger
percentages of victims than formal tort doctrine would have allowed, by providing
awards that were smaller, but more certain, than was theoretically available through
litigation.147 This was accomplished in both systems by simplification—rule-ofthumb categorization and “stereotyped claims practices, rather than conducting
individualized inquiries, to determine questions of compensation.”148
Nora Freeman Engstrom recently chronicled the next stage in the routinization
of automobile accident claims. Over the past three decades, a new business model
in plaintiffs’ personal injury firms has emerged: the “settlement mill.”149 Settlement
mills are “high-volume personal injury law practices that aggressively advertise
and mass produce the resolution of claims, typically with little client interaction
and without initiating lawsuits, much less taking claims to trial.”150 The favorite
claim of these settlement mills is the automobile accident.151
According to Engstrom, at least three factors led to an evolution of conventional
plaintiffs’ firms to settlement mills: (1) advertising; (2) the widespread acceptance
of contingency fees, particularly tiered fees; and (3) the increasingly hostile
litigation environment for personal injury cases.152 The most important factor was
the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,153 holding that
attorney advertising was entitled to First Amendment protection. Because
advertising tends to attract small claims, it is best suited for a high volume business
model.154 Moreover, Engstrom argues that the advent of the tiered contingent fee
contract, originally designed to spur additional attorney effort, instead gave

146. Id. at 1615.
147. Id. at 1595, 1616–17.
148. Id. at 1595.
149. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485,
1486 (2009).
150. Id. Engstrom elaborates that there are ten characteristics that distinguish settlement
mills from conventional personal injury firms:
Settlement mills necessarily[:] (1) are high-volume personal injury practices
that (2) engage in aggressive advertising from which they obtain a high
proportion of their clients, (3) epitomize “entrepreneurial legal practices,” and
(4) take few—if any—cases to trial. In addition, settlement mills generally (5)
charge tiered contingency fees; (6) do not engage in rigorous case screening
and thus primarily represent victims with low-dollar claims; (7) do not
prioritize meaningful attorney-client interaction; (8) incentivize settlements via
mandatory quotas or by offering negotiators awards or fee-based compensation;
(9) resolve cases quickly, usually within two-to-eight months of the accident;
and (10) rarely file lawsuits.
Id. at 1491–92 (footnote omitted).
151. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 807
(2011).
152. Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1521–29.
153. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
154. Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1522–23.
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attorneys a means to dissuade clients from insisting on proceeding with
litigation.155 Finally, increasing litigation costs and decreasing median jury trial tort
awards, and awareness of the same by plaintiffs’ lawyers, made it less attractive to
take cases to trial.156
Settlement mills push the law further from a focus on individualized justice and
the fault standard. The focus of settlement mills is on volume; settlement mill
attorneys often have triple the caseload of conventional personal injury attorneys.157
Engstrom notes that “[e]fficiency trumps process and quality.”158 Settlement mills
decline few cases; one interviewee noted the “modus operandi was to sign
everything up.”159 Thus, “[f]actual investigations are short-circuited or skipped
altogether.”160 Many of the settlement mill employees interviewed by Engstrom
were explicit: “[T]here was never any investigation done of the claim . . . . The only
investigation that was ever done was whether or not someone had insurance.”161
Two other employees of the same firm answered simply “[n]one” to a question
about the extent of an investigation performed by the firm.162 Much of the work in
settlement mills, including negotiating with insurance adjusters, is performed by
non-lawyers.163 The primary incentive for settlement mill employees—lawyers and
non-lawyers alike—is to close files.164 Thus, when an insurance adjuster is
negotiating with a representative from a settlement mill, the primary incentive on
both sides is to close the file.165 Although conventionally represented automobile
accident plaintiffs rarely try a case to verdict—approximately 2.8%166—the rates at
settlement mills are far lower. Engstrom calculated rates of approximately 0.5%,
0.3%, and 0.2% for various settlement mills.167 Despite settlement mills’ “cattle
call” nature of signing up clients, cases in which an insurer makes no offer at all are
quite rare.168
According to Engstrom, this system, providing “near universal (though
sometimes partial) compensation,” does not support the conventional wisdom that
parties “bargain in the shadow of the law.”169 First, the parties are not motivated by
their knowledge of how similar cases fared at trial because settlement mill
negotiators typically lack this knowledge.170 Second, the parties are not motivated
by their prediction of how this particular case would fare at trial because settlement

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1524–27.
Id. at 1527–29.
Id. at 1492.
Id. at 1493.
Id. at 1499.
Id. at 1493.
Id. at 1508.
Id.
Id. at 1518.
Id. at 1501.
See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1495.
Id. at 1496–97.
Id. at 1517 n.207.
Id. at 1547.
Id. at 1530–31.
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mill negotiators perform, at best, cursory investigations of the facts.171 Third,
settlement mill attorneys are simply not prepared to go to trial, so there is no real
alternative to settling the case.172
How, then, are claims valued? “Going rates.”173 Engstrom acknowledges that
going rates “reflect well-established legal rules and entitlements and bear some
relation to past trial verdicts,” but the relationship is “muted” and “relatively
unaffected by the many merit- and non-merit-based factors that would serve to
increase or decrease a claim’s value in a court of law.”174 In essence:
Instead of an individualized and fact-intensive analysis of each case’s
strengths and weaknesses alongside a careful study of case law and
comparable jury verdicts, settlement mill negotiators and insurance
claims adjusters assign values to claims with little regard to fault based
on agreed-upon formulas, keyed off lost work, type and length of
treatment, property damage, and/or medical bills, which in turn relate to
the severity of the injury.175
While ostensibly operating within traditional tort law, settlement mills function
more like no-fault insurance, providing fairly certain and standardized sums at
relatively low systemic cost.176
A significant issue is the number of settlement mills operating in America.
Engstrom admits that if the model she described was limited to the eight firms she
investigated, it would be interesting but not very important.177 She further
acknowledges the impossibility of an exact calculation. Engstrom, however,
presents anecdotal and empirical evidence that settlement mills are fairly common.
First, anecdotal evidence exists from interviews with insurance claims adjusters. In
a disciplinary hearing in Louisiana, an attorney sought to demonstrate that his use
of non-lawyers to negotiate with insurance adjusters was unremarkable. The
adjusters named at least ten firms in the state, exclusive of firms Engstrom
interviewed, that followed the practice.178 One adjuster even stated that the majority
of her negotiations were with non-lawyers.179 Conventional personal injury
plaintiffs’ firms are extremely unlikely to allow non-lawyers to negotiate with
insurers.180 Moreover, researchers are beginning to publish descriptions of firms

171. Id. at 1531–32 (“Most of the cases I handled, I didn’t even know the facts of the
case.”).
172. Id. at 1532.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1533.
175. Id. at 1534 (footnote omitted).
176. Engstrom, supra note 151, at 809.
177. See Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1514. She has since compiled information on
another four firms, bringing the total to twelve firms in ten different states. Nora Freeman
Engstrom, Legal Access and Attorney Advertising, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
1083, 1083 (2011).
178. Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1518.
179. Id.
180. Id. I was an associate at a conventional personal injury plaintiffs’ firm from 1996
until 2003. Non-lawyers never negotiated with insurers at our firm, and I knew of no firm at
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with settlement mill features.181 The empirical evidence consists of two sets of data
indicating substantial decreases in tort filings during time periods in which
automobile accident and injury rates increased.182 Engstrom notes these
counter-intuitive trends, more accidents and injuries with more lawyer
representation yet fewer lawsuits, are consistent with the rise of settlement mills.
As RAND stated while trying to make sense of these trends: “[I]t appears they are
being settled elsewhere, in forums that produce stable, predictable outcomes.”183
In sum, civil recourse theory, an avowedly descriptive theory that holds tort law
to be unified by wrongs, does not accurately describe the treatment of many
automobile accident claims. Treatment of an automobile accident as a wrong is the
exception and not the rule because many repeat players on both sides are more
interested in their portfolios as a whole than the outcome of particular cases. Thus,
even when adjusters have strong doubts on liability, they are reluctant to pay less
than the medical bills, and some amount of payment is made in the vast majority of
cases with high damages regardless of the facts on liability.184 For most automobile
accident claims, the system provides not the redress of wrongs, but predictability of
payments for insurers and compensation that is more swift and certain for plaintiffs.
which that occurred.
181. Id. at 1520–21. See also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers:
Dealing with the Possible But Not Certain, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 337, 356 (2011).
One highly respected plaintiffs’ lawyer was emphatic in his criticism of
television advertising, which to him seems unprofessional. What especially
bothered him “are the people who are not competent to handle business, that
advertise, get the business, and then instead of referring the better cases, they
handle those cases in a less than satisfactory way. They make a fee on it, but
their client is not very well served. The way they make their money is on a
volume practice. I view those people as bottom feeders.” Another lawyer said
that heavy advertisers “are not fulfilling a role as an attorney, they’re doing
nothing but adjusting claims from the plaintiffs’ standpoint.”
Id. A former student recently requested a reference for a position, but confided that she was
worried the firm might be “a mill.”
182. Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1519–20. In one study, from 1977 to 1997, lawyer
participation in the settlement of third-party automobile accident personal injury claims
increased significantly, yet the chance that any particular claim would produce a lawsuit
dropped dramatically. Mark J. Browne & Joan T. Schmit, Patterns in Personal Automobile
Third-Party Bodily Injury Litigation: 1977-1997 (Sept. 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=588481. In the second study, during 1992–2001, the National
Center for State Courts reports that automobile tort filings declined 14% in the seventeen
states (with 53% of the U.S. population) covered by available data. Engstrom, supra note
149, at 1519 (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 2002: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 26 (2002)).
During the same period, the number of traffic accidents with injuries and the number of
overall traffic accidents both increased. Id. at 1519–20 (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS &
ANALYSIS, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2005, at 1).
183. Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1520 (citing DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN
TORT LITIGATION 8–9, 32 (1987)). In many ways, the foregoing critique is an elaboration of
Mike Rustad’s point that civil recourse does not sufficiently account for major players in the
tort system, such as insurers and plaintiffs’ lawyers. See Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public
Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 480 (2011).
184. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
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As noted recourse theorist Jason Solomon stated: “Because of the now-routinized
system of insurance claims, it may well be that the most common type of tort claim
is quite far from the ideals of civil justice.”185
E. Responses
Goldberg has already responded to the general idea that “settlement and
insurance have rendered tort law obsolete.”186 He made four main points in
response. However, Goldberg’s arguments are weakened by the automobile
accident context. Although I agree with Goldberg that settlement and insurance
have not rendered tort law obsolete, at least as applied to automobile accidents, I
believe they demonstrate that neither is tort law unitary.
First, and most significantly, Goldberg argued that tort claims are still processed
in “the shadow of the law;”187 the settlement process takes cues from formal law on
liability and damages. The problem for Goldberg is that the shadow of the law
becomes faint on the crucial issue of liability in many automobile accident cases.188
On the question of whether torts are wrongs, the category that matters is liability.
According to the more traditional model chronicled by Ross, the shadow of the law
provides loose constraints to settlement. Even when evidence of liability was weak,
adjusters were described as reluctant to offer less than the costs of medical bills.189
The larger the damages in an automobile accident case, the more important the
shadow of the law becomes.190 However, even in the vast majority of claims with
high damages, some amount of compensation was paid regardless of the facts on
liability.191 Engstrom’s scholarship on settlement mills is suggestive of a category
of law firm for which the shadow of the law on liability virtually disappears. In
cases involving settlement mills, the firms accept almost all clients and receive an
offer for some amount of compensation for almost all of them. Engstrom noted one
mill accepted 2107 of 2204 potential automobile accident clients.192 Yet the
proportion of cases that receive no offer from insurers is miniscule; in multiple
interviews with settlement attorneys in different firms, the attorneys estimated the
percentage of “no offer” cases at less than 1%.193 Even if it were conceded that
formal law was based on the non-instrumentalist wrongs described by civil
recourse theory,194 insurance-driven settlement practices reduce or eliminate the
importance of wrongs in many cases.

185. Jason M. Solomon, What is Civil Justice?, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 331 (2010).
186. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1264. For a list of ways that liability insurance shapes
tort, see Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability
Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005).
187. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1264–65.
188. I thank Tom Baker for helping me understand the scope of this point.
189. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
190. See ROSS, supra note 102, at 135.
191. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
192. Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1511.
193. Id. at 1517 n.207. One attorney estimated his percentage of “no offer” cases as high
as 20%, but his claims were all valued in excess of $25,000. Id.
194. I think formal law is more complicated. Automobile accident claims in most
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Second, Goldberg argued an actual jury holding is not necessary for tort law to
operate as a law for redressing wrongs. As long as governments provide courts to
adjudicate claims for wrongs and claimants have the ability to access them, that is
sufficient. It is acceptable if such access results in “negotiated settlement conducted
on terms shaped by governing law.”195 As to this second point, I agree that an
actual jury verdict is not necessary for tort to function as a system for redressing
wrongs in the way that Goldberg and Zipursky describe. However, on the issue of
liability, as just noted, governing law’s role in shaping automobile accident
settlements is not robust. Moreover, the sheer amount of settled, as opposed to
tried, cases demonstrates that claimants have multiple objectives in pursuing
claims. Recall that less than three percent of automobile cases are tried to
verdict.196 Undoubtedly, as Goldberg and Zipursky remind us, some claimants want
vindication and to be taken seriously. But the ultimate vindication is a jury verdict
in the claimant’s favor, a public acknowledgment of the claimant’s victory. If that
was all that motivated claimants, far fewer cases would end in a compromised
claim with the claimant accepting the defendant’s statement denying wrongdoing
and perhaps a confidentiality provision. Other factors, such as compensation—
which can be especially pressing for some claimants—and general peace must
factor into the calculations of many of them.
Third, Goldberg asserted that even though insurance can blunt the extent to
which wrongdoers are required to answer for their wrongs, it also makes redress
available to victims who would not otherwise obtain it. In fact, Goldberg argued it
instantiates a sense of responsibility to others: “To purchase liability insurance is to
acknowledge, at a basic level, one’s tort duties.”197 Here, too, I agree with much of
Goldberg’s argument. Insurance undermines the direct link between wrongdoers
and the consequences of their actions. But it plays many positive roles. It allows for
victims to be compensated, and it can serve a regulatory function.198 Yet, on this
point as well, automobile accidents differ from many tort causes of action. It is
possible to see the purchase of liability insurance, especially voluntary liability
insurance, as an acknowledgment of tort duties. On the other hand, it is also
possible to see it as the selfish (but reasonable) desire to protect personal assets.
jurisdictions are formally premised on negligence. Every element of negligence includes
instrumentalism. Duty is often a multi-factor policy analysis, including factors such as
concern over “crushing exposure to liability.” Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36
(N.Y. 1985). In the breach analysis, formally governed by the instrumentalist-inspired
objective standard, “utility” is often considered. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291
cmt. d (1965). Proximate cause often involves courts’ use of “public policy” and “practical
politics” from Judge Andrews’s dissent in Palsgraf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162
N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Finally, damages may be capped for
instrumentalist efficiency reasons. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b)
(LexisNexis 2006) (passing a $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury
actions to ease perceived pressure on liability insurers); see Alan Calnan, The Distorted
Reality of Civil Recourse Theory, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 159, 183–92 (2012); Robinette, supra
note 7, at 482–83.
195. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1266.
196. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
197. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1269.
198. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Insurance in Sociolegal Research, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
433 (2010).
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Automobile insurance, because it is compulsory, is another step removed. Motorists
may purchase compulsory insurance because it is required of them. And it is
required of them because the scope of automobile accident injuries reached such a
level of “hellish carnage”199 that it became an issue of public policy, acted on by
legislatures.
Finally, Goldberg argued that tort law sets standards of proper conduct, and it
often performs this function regardless of whether litigation arises.200 Although this
argument may be stronger for non-automobile cases, there are two serious
problems with arguing that automobile accident law sets standards of proper
driving. First, the (vague) negligence standard in the automobile accident context
has been largely subsumed by traffic law. Insurance adjusters and lawyers do not
typically inquire as to whether a given driver has driven “reasonably under the
circumstances” (which standard would provide no guidance to drivers anyway).
They instead ask an easier question. Namely, Ross tells us they rely on traffic laws
in adjusting the vast majority of claims.201 In essence, the legislature sets the
standard that tort law then borrows.202 Of course, it is not then true that tort is
setting standards. Second, even if the guidance of formal tort law was specific and
useful, most drivers would not know it. Absent special circumstances, the average
driver does not follow automobile accident decisions in her jurisdiction. Unlike tort
causes of action involving institutional defendants, say medical malpractice and
hospitals or products liability and manufacturers, drivers do not typically have a
supervisor or someone with an incentive to follow tort doctrine and keep them
apprised of it. Traffic laws, many of which are actually posted on signs on the
highway, are quite different. But again, drivers do not know tort law; they know
traffic law.
CONCLUSION
Civil recourse theory is rich, subtle, and comprehensive. It has been extremely
influential in tort theory, and is now affecting areas of the law beyond torts.
Moreover, I think Goldberg and Zipursky deserve considerable credit for shifting
tort theory back from the view that tort law is only about public policy and that the
parties’ sole role in a tort suit is implementing it. Yet civil recourse, which is a
descriptive theory, does not accurately describe tort law.
Moreover, it distracts theorists from the crucial issue of when to treat claims as
wrongs and when to treat them as routinized, compensable events. As a descriptive
matter, tort law already treats claims both ways. The most critical normative
question in tort law today is how to properly draw the line between the two. As
discussed earlier, a routinized, compensable treatment of torts provides benefits to

199. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
200. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1269–70.
201. ROSS, supra note 102, at 20 (stating that the investigation of claims “consist[s]
mainly in discovering violations of the traffic law”).
202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 14 cmt. d. (2010) (“[I]n most highway-accident cases, findings of negligence
depend on ascertaining which party has violated the relevant provisions of the state’s
motor-vehicle code.”) I thank Nora Engstrom and Kyle Graham for this point.
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both parties. For defendants, liability payments become more predictable;
transaction costs such as time and attorneys’ fees are reduced. Plaintiffs receive
compensation that is much more certain and swift, and avoid many of the
unpleasant aspects of pursuing a claim in litigation.203 Yet surely some defendants
have engaged in acts for which this more casual treatment is not appropriate.
Goldberg and Zipursky are surely correct to note that some claimants are not just
looking for payment, but rather the sense that their claims are taken seriously; they
seek vindication.204 There are two types of torts. We need to focus on the best
way(s) to distinguish them.

203. For these reasons, Engstrom gives settlement mills a passing grade: “in substance,
settlement mills have managed to shed a number of tort’s most maligned attributes and
achieve many of no-fault’s laudable goals: They arguably expand access to compensation,
reduce court congestion, and offer their clients relative speed, predictability, and certainty,
all at fairly low systemic cost.” Engstrom, supra note 151, at 809.
204. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

